Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Hardcover by Borgers, Tilman;...

Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Hardcover by Borgers, Tilman; Krahmer, Daniel (CON); Strausz, Roland (CON), ISBN 019973402X, ISBN-13 9780199734023, Like New Used, Free shipping in the USWhat is the best way to auction an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In <em>An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design</em>, Tilman Börgers addresses these questions and more through an<br>exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design. Mechanism design is reverse game theory. Whereas game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, the theory of mechanism design goes a step further and selects the optimal rules<br>of the game. <br><br>A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself as well as the results of the instrument. <em>An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design</em> provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem<br>on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Börgers also provides an<br>examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.<br>